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Estimating Heterogeneous Take-up and Crowd-Out Responses 
to Marginal and Non-Marginal Medicaid Expansions
* 
 
We use a linear probability model with interactions and a switching probit model (SPM) to 
estimate heterogeneous effects of Medicaid expansions on Medicaid take-up, private 
insurance coverage and crowd-out. Specifically, we estimate: i) LATEs; ii) ATETs for the 
currently eligible; and iii) ATETs for those made eligible by a non-marginal (counterfactual) 
expansion in Medicaid eligibility. Both estimation methods can control for observable 
differences across individuals, while SPM can also control for unobservable differences. For 
Medicaid take-up and private insurance coverage, the effects are precisely estimated and 
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In recent years, eligibility for public health insurance has expanded substantially, leading 
to a burgeoning of research on the implications of such expansions for public insurance 
participation, private insurance crowd-out, and overall levels of health insurance coverage.  A 
common approach to these questions is to estimate a linear probability model of participation (or 
private or overall insurance coverage) where a dummy variable for eligibility for the program is 
an endogenous explanatory variable and exogenous variation in eligibility is used to generate an 
instrumental variable (see Cutler and Gruber (1996), Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b), LoSasso 
and Buchmueller (2004), Hudson, Selden, and Banthin (2005), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), 
and Shore-Sheppard (2008), among others). This model permits the estimation of Local Average 
Treatment Effects (LATEs) on take-up and crowd-out—the average effect of eligibility on 
insurance coverage among individuals who are responsive to small changes in the instrument 
used for identification—the marginally eligible.  This approach, while quite useful, has three 
drawbacks. First, the composition of the group to which the LATE estimates apply is generally 
unobserved by the researcher. Second, the estimated LATEs provide no information about which 
sub-groups have low or high responses to marginal or non-marginal (large, counterfactual) 
changes in eligibility. As we demonstrate below, observable groups vary dramatically in their 
take-up response to marginal or non-marginal Medicaid expansions, and it would be very helpful 
for policy makers to know how responses differ when designing outreach programs. Third, this 
model may lead to misleading predictions of the effects of non-marginal expansions if the 
individuals made eligible by a non-marginal expansion of Medicaid income limits across 
children’s age groups and states have different observed or unobserved characteristics than those 
for whom the LATEs are estimated.  
  2Recently, the empirical program evaluation literature has seen a number of papers that 
explicitly estimate heterogeneous treatment effects for different groups, and thus have the 
potential to be much more informative for policy analysis.  The majority of these effects have 
been estimated within the education and training literature (see, e.g., Aakvik, Heckman, and 
Vytlacil (2005—hereafter AHV), Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005), Card and Payne (2003), 
Heckman, Smith, and Clemens (1997), and Moffitt (2007)), although there are other applications 
(see, e.g., Angrist (2004) for treatment effect heterogeneity in the effects of childbearing on 
marital dissolutions, poverty status, and welfare participation). One popular approach in this 
literature is to estimate a linear probability model where the treatment dummy variable is 
interacted with demographic variables to estimate LATEs for different demographic groups; in 
what follows we refer to this model as a linear probability model with interactions (LPMI). 
Another approach is to use a switching probit model (SPM) to predict the effect of changing 
treatment on the basis of observables and unobservables.
1  
In this paper we use these two approaches to go beyond the existing studies on Medicaid 
expansions that focus on estimating a single LATE in models of take-up and crowd-out (defined 
as the change in the probability of private coverage due to a change in eligibility status).  Using 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we provide LATE estimates 
for marginal Medicaid expansions for different demographic groups.  We also estimate take-up, 
participation and crowd-out responses to non-marginal (counterfactual) Medicaid expansions, 
                                                 
1 The first approach is used by Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) and Card and Payne (2003) while 
the second is used by AHV. The approach introduced in Moffitt (2007) can be considered a combination 
of the two, since he allows treatment effects to depend on both observables and unobservables that are 
correlated with the error in the outcome of interest within a random coefficients framework. Heckman, 
Smith, and Clemens (1997) use propensity score matching while allowing for treatment heterogeneity, 
while Angrist (2004) uses an IV framework to show the relationship between LATEs and average 
treatment effects under certain assumptions. 
  3parameters that are very useful for policymakers contemplating further expansions of program 
eligibility.  
In estimating responses to non-marginal Medicaid expansions we extend the program 
evaluation literature in several directions. First, we approximate the responses to non-marginal 
Medicaid changes for different demographic groups using the LPMI. We describe this approach 
as an approximation since it captures observable, but not unobservable, differences between 
those made eligible by a marginal Medicaid expansion and a non-marginal Medicaid expansion. 
Second, we simplify the existing approach to estimating the responses to non-marginal changes 
in eligibility that uses a SPM; our simplification arises from the fact that Medicaid eligibility is 
based on observable criteria.
2  We then use this simplification to estimate the responses to non-
marginal Medicaid changes across different demographic groups.  This method is able to account 
for both observable and unobservable differences within a demographic group between those 
made eligible by a marginal Medicaid expansion and those made eligible by a non-marginal 
Medicaid expansion. Finally, we show how we can use existing average Medicaid take-up rates 
in the data to perform an informal investigation of how well each of these approaches is likely to 
do in capturing the responses to non-marginal Medicaid expansions. 
The LATE estimates we obtain differ widely across different demographic groups, 
suggesting that they will indeed be useful to policy makers, particularly those concerned with 
outreach Furthermore, our findings using both LPMI and SPM approaches indicate that there is 
substantial heterogeneity across different demographic groups in their responses to non-marginal 
(counterfactual) Medicaid expansions, and that the estimated take-up propensity for the average 
eligible child is substantially larger than the take-up propensity for a child made eligible by a 
                                                 
2 These extensions can be used to evaluate the effects of non-marginal changes in other programs as long 
as program eligibility is based on observable factors. 
  4counterfactual Medicaid expansion. Finally, we find that the SPM does a much better job of 
fitting current Medicaid average take-up rates and private insurance coverage rates among those 
eligible across demographic groups in the actual data. Since we develop versions of both 
approaches that can be estimated by standard Stata programs, the SPM approach appears more 
useful for researchers.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the Medicaid program and 
some previous studies that have used a two-equation linear probability model to estimate the 
insurance responses to Medicaid expansions. In Section 3, we outline this standard approach to 
public health insurance take-up and private insurance crowd-out. We then describe our use of the 
LPMI and SPM to estimate a range of heterogeneous treatment/policy effects, and discuss our 
data from the SIPP briefly in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide our estimates of LATEs by 
demographic group using the LPMI. We then use both the LPMI and SPM to estimate 
heterogeneous effects for non-marginal (counterfactual) expansions in the Medicaid income 
limits.  Section 6 concludes the paper.     
2. Medicaid Expansions and Previous Literature   
Medicaid was first established as a public health insurance program for welfare recipients 
and low-income aged and disabled individuals. This focus largely remained until the late 1980s, 
when expansions in eligibility first permitted, and then required, states to cover pregnant women 
and children with family incomes that made them ineligible for cash welfare.  Following the 
federally mandated eligibility expansions of 1989 and 1990, states were required to cover 
children age 6 or younger with family incomes up to 133% of the poverty line, and children born 
after September 30, 1983 with family incomes up to 100% of the poverty line.  States were also 
given the option to increase their eligibility thresholds up to 185% of the poverty line.  As these 
  5eligibility limits were far more generous than the eligibility limits applying to cash welfare (at 
the time, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC), the link between Medicaid 
eligibility and AFDC eligibility greatly diminished for young, low-income children.  By 1996, of 
the approximately 30% of children age 19 and younger who were eligible for Medicaid, only 
about half came from typically welfare-enrolled families (Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1998).  
While families who enrolled in cash welfare programs were also automatically enrolled in 
Medicaid, children newly eligible for the program were not.  Consequently the establishment of a 
new route to Medicaid eligibility raised two important policy questions. First, to what extent did 
expanded eligibility lead to increased health insurance coverage for the targeted population of 
children? Second, did expanded eligibility lead to “crowding out” of private health insurance by 
public insurance availability (and if so to what extent), since newly eligible children were less 
poor than previously eligible children and hence more likely to have access to private insurance?  
There has been a substantial amount of research on these initial Medicaid expansions,  
and a non-exhaustive list includes Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b), Cutler and Gruber (1996), 
Dubay and Kenney (1996), Thorpe and Florence (1998), Yazici and Kaestner (1999), Shore-
Sheppard (2000), Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Ham 
and Shore-Sheppard (2005), and Shore-Sheppard (2008). Further, there is also research on the 
related question of how the further public health insurance expansions of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) affected coverage and crowd-out (see LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2004), Hudson, Selden, and Banthin (2005), and Gruber and Simon (2008)).  The 
above papers have provided estimates of a variety of behavioral parameters related to the 
responsiveness of children’s insurance coverage to expanded eligibility.  The most common 
approach used for estimating effects of expanded eligibility is an instrumental variable linear 
  6probability model (LPM) that we describe in more detail below. This approach produces LATE 
estimates of take-up and private coverage responses for an unknown (to the researcher) group of 
individuals who are responsive to small changes in the instrument used for identification. Of 
course, the LATE estimates are not the same as the average take-up rate or private coverage loss 
among all eligible children (that is, including those children who were eligible prior to the 
expansion being studied). Moreover, they generally do not reflect the change that would occur in 
take-up or private coverage from a medium-sized or large change in eligibility.
3  Definitions of 
“crowd-out”—loosely, the effect of public insurance availability on the propensity to have 
private coverage—are particularly diverse in the literature. For expositional purposes we will 
focus on one definition, but our methodology is easily generalized to other definitions. In this 
paper, we estimate a host of additional effects for take-up and crowd-out.  
Since our aim in this paper is to extend previous results rather than summarizing the 
literature, here we focus on two of the studies that use this now standard approach.  An important 
study using this approach is the seminal paper of Cutler and Gruber (1996—CG hereafter).  CG 
use a linear probability model (LPM) and data on children from the March Current Population 
Survey (CPS) from 1988 to 1993 to estimate the effect of imputed Medicaid eligibility on 
insurance status, controlling for demographics and state and year effects.  They use an IV version 
of the LPM (discussed briefly in Section 3.2 below) since eligibility is likely to be endogenous.  
This potential endogeneity arises for several reasons.  First, unobservable factors affecting 
eligibility are likely to be correlated with unobservable factors driving family characteristics that 
determine eligibility.  Second, eligibility may serve as a proxy for family income if income, 
which is also likely to be endogenous, is not included as an independent variable.  Finally, 
parental wages, which in turn determine eligibility, are likely to be correlated with fringe benefits 
                                                 
3 These distinctions have often been missed in the literature.    
  7(including private health insurance) of the parent. Since these benefits are unobserved, they are 
part of the error term, thus providing an additional factor necessitating treating eligibility as 
endogenous. To address the endogeneity of the eligibility variable, CG suggest an instrument 
(which we denoteFRACELIG) that is the fraction of a random sample of 300 children of each age 
imputed to be eligible according to the rules in each state in each year.  This instrument, which is 
essentially an index of the expansiveness of Medicaid eligibility for each age group in each state 
and year, is correlated with individual eligibility for Medicaid but not otherwise correlated with 
the demand for insurance, assuming that changes in a state’s Medicaid provisions are not 
correlated with changes in the state’s availability of private insurance, which are unobservable to 
the researcher.
4 CG estimate LATEs for take-up and crowd-out of 23.5% and 7% respectively. 
As noted above these IV estimates are for those children whose eligibility is sensitive to a small 
change in FRACELIG. 
  Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005–HS hereafter) use data from the SIPP covering the 
period from October 1985 to August 1995 to replicate CG’s analysis. As with CG, they estimate 
LATEs, and thus the results of the two papers are comparable.  HS find smaller LATEs for take-
up rate and crowd-out than CG. They attribute some of the differences between their results and 
CG’s to different samples and recall periods in SIPP and the CPS.  HS also modify the CG 
instrument by using all sample observations of children of a given age in a SIPP wave except for 
those from the state for which the instrument is being calculated. Since this instrument is created 
using a larger sample, it is theoretically superior to the version using a random sample, but in 
                                                 
4 One attractive feature of this approach is that  FRACELIG  is an extremely strong instrument. This is very 
helpful since we obtain precisely estimated marginal treatment effects for many demographic groups 
using  FRACELIG  times the demographic variables as instruments; this is not always the case in 
estimating such a model, see, e.g. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005).   
  8practice its use makes very little difference to the results.  We use the data and instrument of HS 
in our estimation.  
3. Estimating the Effects of Marginal and Non-Marginal (Counterfactual) Medicaid 
Expansions Across Demographic Groups 
3.1 Estimating LATEs for Medicaid Expansions   
Following the above literature, we first explicitly discuss using simultaneous equation 
LPMs. The LPM for participation in a public insurance program is given by  
i1 1 =,   ii 1 i pub X elig u                                                          (1a) 
where  i X  is a vector of demographic variables for child i,   is a dummy variable coded one if 
the child is eligible for public insurance and zero otherwise,  is an error term, and 
i elig
1i u 1  i pub  if 
child i participates in a public insurance program, otherwise 0  i pub . The LPM for private 
insurance coverage is given by 
i2 2 =,   ii 2 i priv X elig u                                                                  (1b) 
where   if child i has private insurance coverage and  1  i priv 0  i priv  otherwise. For ease of 
exposition, think of  i X  as a fully interacted vector of demographic variables that equal one for a 
given demographic cell and zero otherwise. The LPM determining public insurance eligibility is  
,   ii elig Z ei
i
                                                            (2) 
where ( , )  ii Z X FRACELIG , and   is an error term. From the discussion in CG, it is clear that 
they interpret the coefficients 
i e
1   and 2   as LATEs, i.e. treatment effects for individuals whose 
eligibility is affected by marginal changes in . While these LATEs provide useful 
summary statistics, they will be less useful for predicting the effect of an eligibility change that 
i FRACELIG
  9affects children with different characteristics, estimating average take-up rates among the 
currently eligible or estimating take-up among those made eligible by a non-marginal expansion. 
To address these limitations,  we first consider a model that consists of a LPMI for 
participation in public insurance and a LPMI for participation in private insurance. Specifically, 
we interact  with each of the K elements of  i elig i X  to obtain
5 
i1 1 1 1 1
1




ii i i i k k k i
k
1 .  i pub X elig X u X elig u                                     (3a) 
We follow the same approach to obtain the following LPMI for private insurance participation 
i2 2 2 2 2
1




ii i i i k k k i
k
2  i priv X elig X u X elig u .                        (3b) 
The natural vector of excluded instruments in (3a) and (3b) for the K by 1 vector of endogenous 
variables   is the K by 1 vector   This model therefore estimates a 
LATE for each demographic cell in the data, and we use 
( ) ii elig X ( * ). ii FRACELIG X
12 ˆˆ ()   jj to estimate the effect of 
eligibility on the Medicaid (private insurance) participation for a given group of individuals with 
characteristics . j X
6 
3.2  Estimating Take-Up and Coverage Effects Using the Linear Probability Model with 
Interactions 
As noted above, standard LATE estimates show the response for an unknown group of 
individuals, and our LPMI estimates identify marginal responses for unknown individuals within 
each demographic group. However, for a Medicaid expansion we can identify the marginal 
                                                 
5 An alternative approach would be to use  ˆ (* (* ) )  ii XZ   as a vector of instruments, where  ˆ   is estimated 
by (2) –see Amemiya (1985). However, for comparability with other studies, we follow the procedure in 
the text. 
6 In what follows  1 ˆ  j  is our estimate of  1  j , and we define other estimated parameters in an analogous 
way. 
  10group whose behavior is reflected by the IV coefficients, i.e. those whose eligibility in the group 
is affected by a small change in FRACELIG. (Note we are using small changes in FRACELIG as 
representing a marginal Medicaid expansion.) A natural way of identifying this group is to see 
who becomes newly eligible in the data for a small change in the Medicaid limits that would 
correspond to a small change in FRACELIG. For example, one could look at which children 
become eligible when the income limits relevant to their age and state go from 1% below their 
current value to 1% over their current value. 
More importantly, we can use a similar approach to identify the group of children made 
eligible by a non-marginal expansion of Medicaid, such as a 10% increase in the income limits 
for each age group in each state—again we can observe which children in the data become newly 
eligible from this change.
7 Of course, those made eligible by a marginal change and those made 
eligible by a non-marginal change will differ in terms of observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Given knowledge of who is made eligible by the non-marginal Medicaid 
expansion, our use of the LPMI allows us to take into account the observable differences, but not 
unobservable differences, between these newly eligible and the marginally eligible to estimate 
take up by the newly eligible, as we show below. This approach is not currently available in the 
literature.  
  We first consider average take-up rate and begin by identifying who is eligible under the 
current income limits. We estimate the average take-up rate among the eligible—the Average 










ATRE X X N / , e
                                                
                               (4a) 
 
7 We abstract from the possibility that individuals above the new cutoffs may reduce their income so that 
their children will qualify for Medicaid. 
  11where  1 ˆ   and  1 ˆ  are parameter estimates from (3a) and   is the number of eligible children. 
Here we use 
e N
1 ˆ   to impute take-up for all observably eligible individual, noting that this is an 
approximation since it only takes into account observable differences between the marginally 
eligible (used to estimate 1 ˆ  ) and all eligible individuals.  We denote the set of children eligible 
for Medicaid in demographic group j by j G . Then we approximate the average take-up rate 
among the eligible for group j as  




lpm , j ii
iG
e j ATRE X X N                                          (4b) 
where   is the number of eligible children in group j.(Although our emphasis in the empirical 
work is estimating  all effects  for different demographic groups, to save space in what follows 
we omit the effects for different groups since it is straightforward to define them.) 
ej N
Furthermore, take-up for a randomly chosen person, i.e. the average treatment effect 










ATR X X N / ,
/ , e
                               (4c) 
where N is the sample size.  
We can measure the average private insurance coverage rate among those who are 










PITE X X N                                (4d) 
and use an analogous expression for the private insurance coverage rate among the eligible in 
demographic group j. We calculate the counterfactual average private insurance coverage rate 
among those eligible, if they were not eligible, as   
  122
1







PITNE X N ,                                  (4e) 
where  2 ˆ   and  2 ˆ  are the estimated values of  2  and  2   respectively from (3b). We define crowd-
out for a child as the probability that the child has private insurance when not eligible for 
Medicaid minus the probability the child has private insurance when eligible for Medicaid. Thus, 
we measure average crowd-out among all those eligible as 
2
1
ˆ [] / 






COE PITNE PITE X N . e
                                                
                                                                     (4f) 
Since the measures in (4a)-(4f) are linear functions of regression coefficients, we can calculate 
their standard errors using preprogrammed commands in Stata.  It is important to note that we 
can only calculate these effects with the LPMI because we can identify who is eligible, and thus 
our approach can be used to estimate take-up in any other programs where eligibility is 
determined based on observable characteristics.
8 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the 
first to approximate these effects using the LPMI. 
  Perhaps more importantly, we also can estimate the take-up response and crowd-out 
effect of a non-marginal Medicaid expansion across different demographic groups using the 
estimates from the LPMI. To calculate the effect of a non-marginal expansion, we first increase 
the income limits by an appropriate amount, and then determine which children would become 
newly eligible under the expansion, denoting this group as New.
9  (In what follows we refer to 
this group as the newly eligible.) Then a natural means of approximating take-up among the 
newly eligible is   
 
8 Details on this calculation and our Stata programs to implement all approaches used in the paper are 
given in our Online Appendix A. 
9 Below we consider a 10 percent increase in the 1995 income limits for all age groups in all states. 










                                        (5a) 
where   is the number of newly eligible.   New N
We estimate private insurance coverage among the newly eligible using  






PITENEW X X N                              (5b) 
In the absence of the non-marginal expansion, these individuals would have had private 
insurance coverage given by  






PITNENEW X N                                          (5c) 
We can estimate the crowd-out effect among all the newly eligible as 






CNEW X N                                     (5d) 
  We should mention, however, one further caveat to our approach, in addition to the fact 
that we cannot control for unobservable differences between the newly eligible and those made 
eligible by a non-marginal Medicaid eligibility expansion. In many datasets, including the one 
we use below, there may not be enough observations to include dummy variables for each 
demographic cell. Instead, we have to settle for controlling for the effect of demographic 
variables without fully interacting them. Thus, we will only be able to control approximately for 
differences in observables across individuals. However, both of these problems are resolved 
when we use the switching probit model in the next section. 
3.3 Estimating the Switching Probit Model  
Our second approach uses the switching probit model (SPM) developed by Quandt 
(1958, 1960, 1972) and Heckman (1979) which has been applied in the bivariate probit with 
  14selection case by van de Ven and van Praag (1981). This model allows us to control for both 
observables and unobservables, once we make a distributional assumption, when estimating 
policy effects. Our approach builds on the important work of AHV and the papers they cite. In 
their paper evaluating the efficacy of a Norwegian vocational training program, AHV introduced 
an econometric model for estimating different policy parameters, i.e. average treatment effect, 
marginal treatment effect, and treatment on treated, when the outcome is discrete and the 
treatment effect is heterogeneous. Our approach differs from that of AHV in several important 
ways.  First, we analyze a program, Medicaid, where a child cannot participate if ineligible, and 
we exploit this feature in estimation and in calculating treatment effects. Second, Medicaid 
eligibility--the treatment in our analysis--is observable given family income, state of residence, 
year and child’s age. We use this in calculating policy effects, and it allows us to consider non-
marginal counterfactual Medicaid expansions. In other words, when we conduct a counterfactual 
policy experiment, we can identify whose treatment status actually changed, and not just the 
change in the probability of receiving treatment.  Knowing who is eligible also allows us to 
consider how well our models mirror the data. (Note that these features of Medicaid apply to 
other programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.) Third, we show that 
policy effects based on the SPM can be precisely estimated, at least for the case of Medicaid; this 
was not the case for AHV. Fourth, we show researchers how pre-programmed commands in 
Stata can be used to estimate all relevant effects and most standard errors. 
One way to proceed is to estimate a joint model with participation in public insurance, 
participation in private insurance, and public insurance eligibility; however this is quite 
complicated to estimate since it requires trivariate integration, and there is no preprogrammed 
routine in Stata to estimate this model. Further, in this model, misspecification in the take-up 
  15equation will cause bias in the private participation equation and vice-versa.  Fortunately, it is 
straightforward to show that all parameters can be estimated consistently by separately 
considering two likelihood functions: one containing the parameters for eligibility and for public 
insurance participation and one containing the parameters for eligibility and for private insurance 
participation. Using separate likelihood functions has the advantage that misspecification in the 
public take-up equation will not cause bias in the private participation equation or vice-versa, 
and the disadvantage that one gives up some efficiency in estimation; these issues are essentially 
identical to those that come up in the trade-off between two-stage least squares and three-stage 
least squares.  
  We first consider the likelihood function containing the parameters for eligibility and for 
public insurance participation. We assume that the index function for eligibility is 
*   ii Elig Z ei .                                              (6) 
Next, we assume that for a randomly chosen (in terms of unobservables) individual, the index 
function for participation in public insurance, once being made exogenously eligible for 
Medicaid, is
10    
*   
i ii PPub X ,                                              (7) 












   
e
e
pub V   
The appropriate log likelihood for eligibility and participation in public insurance is 
, , 22
11 1 ,0 0
log [( , , ] log [ , , ] log [ ],
  1      
   
         e e ii ii i
elig pub elig pub elig
LX Z X Z Z
                                                
      (8) 
 
10 Following the econometrics literature, we consider the index function for take-up for a randomly 
chosen (in terms of  i  ) child exogenously made eligible; note that this also allows us to do counterfactual 
policy analysis.  However, it is worth emphasizing that unless , 0 e    , those actually eligible will not be 
a randomly chosen subgroup of the population. 
  16where  2 [,, ] ,      e  is the bivariate standard normal distribution function and  1()     is the 
univariate standard normal distribution function. For Medicaid take-up calculations we will only 
need the parameters estimated by maximizing (8). 
For crowd-out calculations, we also need to incorporate participation in private insurance, 
so we now consider the likelihood function containing the parameters for eligibility and for 
private insurance participation. We assume that for a randomly chosen individual, the index 
function for participation in private insurance, given exogenous eligibility for public insurance, is  
* r_ .  
i ie e i Pi v e l i g X u                                                (9a) 
We define the observed outcome variable   _ 1
i priv elig if   and zero otherwise.   
Further, we assume that for a randomly chosen individual the index function for participation in 
private insurance given exogenous ineligibility for public insurance is  

* r_ 0
i Pi v e l i g
* r_ ,  
i in e n e i Pi v n e l i g X u                                                (9b)  
and define   if   and zero otherwise.  Finally we assume _1 
i priv nelig
* r_ 0 
i Pi v n e l i g
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The appropriate log likelihood is 
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11 Note that  12  is neither identified nor used in any calculations below. 
  17Unfortunately, even though this likelihood function involves only bivariate integration, 
there is no preprogrammed routine in Stata to estimate this model.  Instead, to obtain an approach 
that can be implemented with preprogrammed commands in Stata, we randomly divide the 
sample into two sub-samples. On the first sub-sample we focus on the take-up of private 
insurance by those eligible for Medicaid and maximize  
12 1 3 2
1, 1 1, 0
1
0
log [( , , ] log [ , , ]
        log [ ].
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Next, on the other sub-sample we focus on the take-up of private insurance by those ineligible 
for Medicaid and maximize 
22 2 3 2
0, 1 0, 0
1
1
log [( , , ] log [ , , ]
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Note that since we randomly chose the sub-samples, the parameter estimates from (11) and (12) 
are independent. 
  The cost of the SPM versus the LPM would seem to be the need for a normality 
assumption, but interestingly this is not what available Monte Carlo evidence suggests. Angrist 
(2001) conducts Monte Carlo experiments for a linear probability model with a discrete 
endogenous regressor estimated by instrumental variables. He finds estimated treatment effects 
that are very close to those from a properly specified simultaneous equation bivariate probit 
model.  In other words, the simultaneous equation LPM does well with normally distributed 
errors. However, Bhattacharya et al. (2006) show that the simultaneous equation LPM does not 
do well when the error terms are not normally distributed. In fact, based on their Monte Carlo 
  18evidence, Bhattacharya et al. (2006) argue in favor of using simultaneous equation bivariate 
probit, rather than the linear probability model, when the error terms are not normally 
distributed.  Thus it appears that the LPM estimates are actually more dependent on the 
normality assumption than are estimates from the simultaneous equation bivariate probit model.  
Of course it would be ideal to eliminate the need to make any distributional assumptions, 
but unfortunately Shaikh and Vytlacil (2005) show that, in general, only bounds on the average 
effect of treatment can be identified in this case. Further, AHV stress the need for making a 
distributional assumption for the treatment effects considered below once the relevant parameters 
have been estimated. Of course, researchers are free to estimate the model with a different 
distributional assumption, e.g. assume that the error terms are drawn from a mixture of normals 
(see e.g., Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003)). We do not adopt this approach since it would 
force us to violate our commitment to using prewritten Stata modules. 
3.4 Estimating Take-Up and Coverage Effects Using the Switching Probit Model and Ignoring 
Selection 
In this section we consider take-up and crowd-out while only controlling for observable 
differences between the marginally eligible and other groups (such as those currently eligible or 
the newly eligible from a non-marginal expansion), as is the case in our LPMI approach.
12  The 










ATRE X N                                           (13a) 
                                                 
12 Below we also use the SPM to examine take-up and crowd-out while controlling for both observable 
and unobservable differences between the marginally eligible and other eligible groups.   
  19where  ˆ is obtained by maximizing (8). (As in the case of all expressions based on the SPM, the 
delta method can be used to calculate the standard errors for these predicted take-up rates in 
Stata.)
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Private insurance coverage rates among the currently eligible are estimated by  
1
11
ˆ [Pr( 0]/    [1- (- )]/ , 

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spm
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elig elig
PITE X u N X N 

                     (13c) 
while the analogous expression, if they were ineligible, is given by  
1
11
ˆ Pr( 0)/ [(1- (- )]/ . 

    
spm
in e n e i e in e e
elig elig
PITNE X u N X N                    (13d) 
Thus we measure average crowd-out among all those eligible when we ignore selection using 
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Note that we obtain ˆ  e and  ˆ  nefrom maximizing (11) and (12) respectively; since we use separate 
random samples the estimates are independent and thus we do not need to calculate their 
covariance in calculating a standard error for (13e).  Expressions (13a)-(13e) are analogous to 
(4a) and (4c)-(4f) respectively for the LPMI. 
                                                 
13 Details of this calculation are given in our Online Appendix A. If one wants to use analytical 
derivatives these need to be programmed, but one can avoid this by using numerical derivatives, which 
are easily calculated. 
  20We can calculate the effects of non-marginal increases in the income limits in an 
analogous manner to that used with the LPMI. For example, consider the non-marginal 
counterfactual policy change of an increase in the Medicaid income limits by 10% in 1995 as 
described in section 3.2 above. To calculate the average take-up rate among the newly eligible 
across all demographic groups using the SPM when we ignore the fact that they will not be a 
random sample of the population (in terms of   and  i e i ), we use 
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Private insurance coverage rates among the newly eligible in this case are estimated by  
1 ˆ [Pr( 0]/    [1- (- )]/ , 
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PITNEWE X u N X N          (14b) 
while the analogous expression, if they were ineligible, is given by  
1 ˆ Pr( 0)/ [(1- (- )]/ . 

    
spm
in e n e i in e
iN e w iN e w
PITNEWNE X u New X New        (14c) 
Thus we measure average crowd-out among the new eligible when we ignore selection as 
11
[Pr( 0)-Pr( 0)]/
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Expressions (14a)-(14d) are analogous to (5a)-(5d) respectively for the LPMI. 
3.5 Estimating Take-Up and Coverage Effects Using the Switching Probit Model While Allowing 
for Selection 
In what follows we present the expressions analogous to those in Section 3.4 for the case 
where we account for the fact that the eligible children will not be a random sample in terms of 
the error term in the eligibility index (6). In this case, we estimate the average take-up among the 
eligible (ATET) as  
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   (15c) 
The parameter estimates used in (15b) and (15c) are obtained by maximizing (11) and (12) 
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     (15d) 
                                                 
14 Moreover, since    22 3 ˆ ˆˆ (,, ) ne  are obtained by maximizing (12) on the first random sub-sample and 
  11 3 ˆ ˆˆ (,, ) e  are obtained by maximizing (11) on the second random sub-sample, the estimates are 
independent and thus the two terms in (15d) are independent.  
 
  22Note that (15a)-(15d) are analogous to (14a)-(14d) when we use the SPM and ignore selection, as 
well as (4a) and (4c)-(4f) when we use the LPMI (and also ignore selection). 
Next we consider the treatment effects for our counterfactual policy change of raising all 
income limits by 10% when we allow for selection. For each individual let  0i Z  denote the value 
of the previous explanatory variables and  1i Z  denote the value of the new explanatory variables 
under the new income limits; note that  0i Z and  1i Z  differ only in terms of the value of 
FRACELIG). Then the probability that a child is newly eligible is given by 
10 Pr( ) Pr(- - )]     ii i newelig Z e Z i .  
In this case average take-up among the newly eligible is given by 
new
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   (16a) 
Next note that private insurance coverage for the newly eligible is given by 
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   (16b)    
In the absence of becoming eligible, these individuals would have private coverage given by 
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                                                    (16c)   
  23Thus crowd-out for the newly eligible while accounting for selection is given by
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     (16d) 
Note that (16a)-(16d) are analogous to (14a)-(14d) where we use the SPM and ignore selection, 
and (5a)-(5d) where we use the LPMI (and also ignore selection).            
4. Data 
We use data from the SIPP 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels, which 
cover the period 1986-1995.  The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal household 
survey specifically designed to collect detailed income and program participation information. 
The recall period between each interview is four months for every individual, and for our panels 
the panel length ranges from 24 months for the 1988 panel to 40 months for the 1992 panel. The 
sample universe is the entire U.S., but the Census Bureau did not separately identify state of 
residence for residents of nine low population states in those panels. Since state of residence 
information is critical for us to impute Medicaid eligibility, we drop all individuals whose state 
of residence is not identified. We also restrict our sample to children living in households that are 
part of the original sample and who are younger than 16 years old at the first time they are 
observed. Finally, for comparability with earlier studies we drop children who are observed only 
once, children who leave the sample and then return, and children who move between states 
                                                 
15 Note that the two sums in the last line of (16d) are independent, again simplifying calculating the 
standard errors.   
 
  24during the sample period.  In total, these omitted observations constitute less than 8% of the 
sample. 
Although the four-month period increases the probability of accurate reporting, 
particularly relative to the fifteen-month recall period of the March Current Population Survey 
(Bennefield 1996), the SIPP suffers from the problem of “seam bias.” Specifically, Census 
Bureau researchers have shown that there are a disproportionate number of transitions between 
the last month of the current wave and the first month of the next wave (see, e.g., Young 1989, 
Marquis and Moore 1990). We use data for all interview months and account for seam bias by 
including a dummy variable for the fourth month of each interview wave. When we calculate 
predicted take-up and crowd-out probabilities, we follow Ham, Li, and Shore-Sheppard (2011) 
and adjust our parameter estimates by dropping the coefficient on the fourth month dummy and 
adding one-quarter of this coefficient to the intercept. In their study of accounting for seam bias 
in a multi-state, multi-spell duration model, Ham, Li and Shore-Sheppard (2011) find that this is 
preferable to using data only from the fourth month of each wave.   
We need to impute Medicaid eligibility and use four steps to do so. First, we construct the 
family unit relevant for Medicaid program participation and determine family income. Second, 
we assign family-specific poverty thresholds based on the size of the family and the year. Since 
Medicaid eligibility resulted from AFDC eligibility over this period, we then use information on 
the family income and family structure, along with the AFDC parameters in effect in the state 
and year, to impute eligibility for AFDC.  Finally, we assign Medicaid eligibility if any of the 
following conditions hold: the child is in an AFDC-eligible family; the child is income eligible 
for AFDC and either lives in a state without a family structure requirement or lives in a state with 
an AFDC-unemployed parent program and has an unemployed parent; or the child’s family 
  25income as a percent of the relevant poverty line is below the Medicaid expansion income 
eligibility cutoff in effect for that age child in his or her state of residence at that time. 
In Table 1 we present the (unweighted) sample means for the variables used in our 
regressions. Both Medicaid participation and Medicaid eligibility rose over the course of the 
sample, while private insurance coverage fell.  The rise in eligibility was particularly dramatic 
between the 1988 and 1990 panels, when federally mandated expansions took effect.  Compared 
with the changes in insurance eligibility and coverage, the demographic variables are fairly 
stable across panels.   
5. Empirical Results 
5.1  Estimates of LATEs and ATETs on the Currently Eligible for Medicaid Take-Up 
 
In this section we consider Medicaid treatment effects for the currently eligible. For the purpose 
of comparison we begin by estimating a LATE using the previous standard in the literature, the 
LPM. In all of the models we estimate we include demographic variables as well as state, year 
and age dummies for each child to control for state-specific, age-specific and year-specific 
unobservables, and since we use longitudinal data, we cluster the standard errors to account for 
dependence across person-specific observations.
16 Using the standard LPM, the estimated take-
up rate averaged across marginal individuals is a very statistically significant 0.127. (See column 
(1) of Table B1 in the Online Appendix.) Since these are IV estimates we need to consider the 
issue of weak IV in the standard model. We cannot investigate whether our instruments are weak 
using the rule of thumb for the F-test being greater than 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock 
                                                 
16 Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) and Shore-Sheppard (2008) suggest including the two-way 
interactions of state by age, state by year, and age by year in models of Medicaid take-up and private 
insurance participation to control for differential trends for groups affected by eligibility expansions.  This 
richer model is not feasible to estimate in the SIPP data when interacting all demographic groups with 
eligibility, but the interactions of eligibility with the year, age, and state dummies serve much the same 
purpose, allowing for differential trends by eligibility status. 
  26(1997), or the refinements of their rule in Stock and Yogo (2005), since the F-test is not 
appropriate if the observations are dependent across the same child or if heteroskedasticity is 
present.  Since the first stage equation is a LPM estimated on panel data, both problems will 
occur in our application. Instead we use the rule of thumb from Hansen, Hausman, and Newey 
(2008) that the Wald statistic for the coefficient on the excluded instrument FRACELIG in the 
first stage equation should be greater than 33 (for one excluded instrument). Since we find that 
the Wald statistic for the coefficient on FRACELIG is approximately 3,500, we conclude that 
weak instruments are not an issue here.  
Using this basic specification, we next estimate the simultaneous equation LPMI 
discussed in section 3, allowing the eligibility effect to depend on demographic variables as well 
as on the state, year and age dummies for each child.
17  On the issue of weak instruments for the 
LPMI model, we do not know of a well-developed rule of thumb or test for weak IV in an 
exactly identified model with K endogenous variables and error terms that are correlated over 
time (for  the same individual) and heteroskedastic. However, our problem has quite a bit of 
structure, since we are essentially asking if   is a strong instrument for   
over  . As our results above indicate that   is an excellent instrument for 
, we also would expect   to be an excellent instrument for e , and 
indeed we find this to be the case in our data.
* i FRACELIG X
FRACEL
* ii k X
i k
K
                                                
ii k elig X
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1,...,  k i IG
i elig FRACELIG lig
18 Finally, if one takes the approach that the 
 
17 The eligibility coefficients for the Medicaid equation are presented in column (3) of Table B1 in the 
Online Appendix; all coefficients are jointly significant.  
 
18 When we test the null hypothesis  0   k  in the quasi first stage regressions 
1 ( * ) , 1,...,    ii k ki k i i k i elig X X FRACELIG X u k K 2 , it is reassuring to note that the minimum Chi-Square 
statistic is 1920, 960, 1280 and 78 for the eligibility*demographics, the eligibility*age dummies, the 
eligibility* year dummies, and the eligibility*state dummies in the first stage equation, respectively. Of 
course this is an informal testing procedure, since the tests are not independent. One could avoid this 
latter problem by testing the null hypothesis 12 ... 0      K . Alternatively, if one followed Amemiya 
  27standard errors for the second stage equation are a good indicator of whether one has a weak IV 
problem when the number of instruments does not grow large with the sample size (see Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2008), then it is clear that weak instruments are not a problem in our 
application, unlike that of Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005).  
In column 1 of Table 2 we present LATE estimates from the LPMI for Medicaid take-up, 
both for the entire population and by demographic group.
19  These estimates show a great deal of 
variation across different demographic groups.  Ignoring the negative values (for children whose 
highest earning parent has a college degree or those in families with two or more earners),
 20 the 
LATE estimates for take-up range from 6 percent for children in the families where both parents 
are present to 44 percent for children in families without any earners.  
Having estimated the LATEs, we next approximate Medicaid take up rates for the 
eligible (the ATET) by demographic group.
21  We focus on these parameters as opposed to the 
average treatment effects (for the general population), since the former are likely to be most 
useful for policy.
22 Column (1) of Table 3 contains the ATETs from the LPMI estimates.  In 
column (2) of Table 3 we present the ATETs from the SPM when we ignore the fact that the 
eligible are not a random sample. Thus, the estimates in columns (1) and (2) are comparable 
                                                                                                                                                             
ˆ *( ) (1985) and used (  ii Z * ii ) as the vector of instruments for elig ˆ  (where  X X   is estimated by (2)), the 
test for weak IV would reduce to testing whether  F i RACELIG i elig  is a weak IV for  , and we have already 
seen that this null hypothesis is decisively rejected by the data.  
19 Column (2) is discussed when we discuss the private coverage results in Section 5.3, below. 
20 Negative probabilities are a common problem in the LPM when estimating probabilities near zero. 
21 We do not present marginal effects for the SPM and compare them to the LATE estimates because it is 
difficult to know what change in income limits corresponds to the one implicit for a LATE estimate. Of 
course the marginal estimates from the SPM do have the advantage that they are constrained to be 
nonnegative. 
22 We do not think that an experiment which makes every American child eligible for Medicaid is 
particularly interesting from a policy perspective since we believe there is little chance that the US will 
move to universal government sponsored health care, let alone one based on the current Medicaid system. 
(We include the relevant expressions for the ATEs since they may be useful in other applications.)  
  28since neither account for unobservables.
23 In column (3) of Table 3 we present Medicaid ATETs 
from the SPM where we take into account the fact that those who are currently eligible for 
Medicaid are not randomly selected.  The estimated ATETs in column (3) for a given 
demographic group are very similar quantitatively to those from models (1) and (2), except for 
children from families with two or more earners.  All estimates are easily statistically 
distinguishable from zero. One positive aspect of calculating ATETs with the SPM is that we 
avoid estimating negative probabilities, which is not true when we use the LPMI. The take-up 
rates in column (3) are somewhat larger than those in columns (1) and (2) because they take into 
account the fact (as indicated by our parameter estimates) that those who are eligible for 
Medicaid have unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to take up Medicaid.  
    For expositional simplicity we focus on the estimates in column (2) for the SPM, where 
the ATETs range from 0.08 for children from families with more than two earners to 0.77 for 
children from families with no earners. The estimates show a clear pattern: eligible children from 
traditionally disadvantaged groups take up Medicaid at a higher rate than eligible children from 
typically less disadvantaged groups.  Eligible white children have a take-up rate of 0.40 while the 
take-up rate for non-white children is fifty percent larger.  The estimated ATET for children in 
families in which the family head has less than a high school degree is 0.60, while it is 0.22 for 
children in families in which the family head has a college degree or more.  Moreover, the take-
up rate for an eligible child from a family in which a female is a single head is 0.68, while it is 
only 0.27 for a child from a two-parent family.  Thus traditionally welfare-ineligible populations 
                                                 
23 The parameter estimates are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table B2 in the Online Appendix, and 
the coefficients in the eligibility index function are jointly significant and generally in the expected 
direction.  While to the best of our knowledge there is no rule of thumb for significance of the coefficient 
on FRACELIG in the eligibility equation, the Wald statistic for this variable is approximately 3600, 
suggesting that the participation equations for public and private insurance are well identified in the SPM.  
 
  29have dramatically lower responses to Medicaid eligibility than do the traditionally welfare-
eligible.  While this has been suspected in the literature previously, ours are the first quantitative 
estimates of the differences in take-up across groups, and they suggest that improving take-up 
among the eligible requires efforts to promote public coverage primarily among populations that 
had not previously been eligible for coverage.  
Finally, in column (4) of Table 3 we present the sample take-up rates among the different 
demographic groups; as is the case in columns (1)-(3) we use only the 1995 data. When we 
compare the predicted take-up rates in the first three columns of Table 3 with the sample take-up 
rate in column (4), the LPMI (column (1)) and the SPM (column (2)), both of which ignore 
unobservables, perform equally well in terms of model fit for the demographic groups with 
higher take-up rates, while the SPM fits the data for the demographic groups with lower take-up 
rates somewhat better. Second, in terms of fitting the actual take-up rates for the eligible by 
demographic group, with the exception of the take-up rate for children from families whose 
highest earner is a college graduate, the SPM that accounts for unobservables (column (3)) 
performs at least as well, and often notably better than, either the LPMI or the SPM ignoring 
unobservables.
 24  
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate a significant advantage of the two approaches we explore 
here over the standard LPM approach. Using the latter, all one can do is use the estimated 
average take-up rate for all marginal individuals, a group whose composition is unobserved, to 
predict the effect of an expansion, while our approach permits us to use estimated take-up rates 
among observable groups of children to predict the effects of an expansion for these different 
groups. Further, our estimates in column (3) of each table allow us to account for the fact that 
                                                 
24Given that all calculations necessary for calculating effects along the lines of column (3) are available in 
our online appendix, these results strongly suggest researchers should use this approach in practice.  
 
  30currently eligible children or those made eligible by our policy experiment will have different 
unobservables.   We find that many of the predicted take-up rates for different groups are 
considerably larger than the estimated take-up rate from the standard model. 
5.2 Estimated ATETs on Medicaid Take-up for a Counterfactual Medicaid Eligibility Expansion 
Thus far, we have focused on using our estimates to examine average treatment effects for the 
currently eligible.  However, another advantage offered by our proposed approaches is the ability 
to do counterfactual policy analysis.  In Table 4, we show the predicted take-up rates for children 
in the 1995 data made newly eligible under a counterfactual policy experiment where we 
increase the 1995 income limits by 10%. In column (1) we make this calculation for the LPMI 
while in column (2) we make this calculation for the SPM while not accounting for unobservable 
differences. Column (3) shows the estimated take-up rates among newly eligible individuals 
using the SPM when we allow for selection.  The estimates in column (3) are again larger than 
those in column (2) because of the positive estimated correlation between unobservables in 
eligibility and unobservables in take-up.  As with the actual expansions, there again are 
differences across groups of the newly eligible in their take-up response to the policy expansion, 
and again the observably less disadvantaged children have substantially lower estimated rates of 
enrolling in the Medicaid program for which they are eligible.  However, the variation across 
groups in response to a non-marginal expansion is less than the variation among the currently 
eligible.  For example, the variation in take-up rates by family structure ranges from 0.3 (for 
children in two-parent families) to 0.72 (for children in female-headed families) when 
considering actual eligibility, but only 0.2 to 0.46 for a counterfactual expansion.  In addition, the 
overall levels of take-up are lower.  This is consistent with a story where conveying information 
about eligibility to potential participants is more difficult for potential participants who do not 
  31have social networks for obtaining such information (see Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 
(2000)).  However, it is also consistent with newly eligible individuals not enrolling because they 
have access to private coverage through their parents’ employment.  We shed some light on this 
issue by examining the private coverage of the Medicaid eligible in Section 5.3 below.   
    Comparing the take-up rates predicted for a counterfactual increase in eligibility to the 
LATE estimates by group (in Table 2, column (1)), the take-up response to the counterfactual 
expansion is predicted to be generally higher than would be predicted by the LATE estimates.  
Interestingly, the average take-up rate for marginal individuals of 0.12 estimated from the 
standard LPM is relatively close to the average take-up rates for newly eligible children from 
two-earner or two-parent families, suggesting that these latter groups may each approximate the 
relevant marginal (unknown) individuals in the standard estimates. This interpretation seems 
especially plausible given that the expansions focused on extending benefits to children in two-
parent families.   
5.3 Estimates of LATEs and ATETs for the Currently Medicaid Eligible on Private Insurance 
Participation and Crowd-out  
To examine the implications of eligibility for private insurance participation and crowd-out, we 
follow the same approach as above and estimate LATEs using the LPMI and then average 
treatment effects using the LPMI and the SPM (now for private insurance coverage and crowd-
out.)
25  The estimated LATEs for crowd-out are in column (2) of Table 2.  There is little 
                                                 
25 When we estimate our LPMI for private insurance, the only statistically significant coefficients are on 
the eligibility main effect and on the interactions of eligibility with gender, male head and the age of the 
highest earner (see column (4) of Table B1 in the Online Appendix).  Of course, this comes with the 
caveat that the number of significant coefficients will be affected by the normalization.  In the SPM we 
find that all demographic variables, except for the gender of the child, are statistically significant in both 
index functions (recall that we estimate separate index functions for a randomly chosen child when the 
child is, and is not, eligible for Medicaid, respectively—see columns (2) and (4) of Table B2 in the Online 
Appendix). The signs of the variables are the same in both index functions, indicating that the effect of 
  32evidence of crowd-out among many demographic groups.  Among the groups showing any 
crowd-out (that is, a negative effect statistically distinguishable from zero), the estimates range 
from 2 percent for children in families with one earner to 12 percent for children in families with 
a male head. 
                                                                                                                                                            
One reason for the fairly low crowd-out rates shown in Table 2 could be that relatively 
few of the eligible children have private coverage.  We examine the rates of private coverage 
participation among eligible children using our three models;
26 the results are in Table 5. The 
estimates based on the LPMI are in column (1). Columns (2) and (3) provide our estimates from 
the SPM when we do not and do account for selection, respectively. These predicted private 
insurance participation effects are precisely estimated and vary widely across groups. Again the 
estimates from the LPMI and SPM that do not account for unobservables are very similar. The 
corresponding estimates from the SPM that account for unobservables are qualitatively similar, 
though they are smaller, reflecting the negative correlation between the unobservables in the 
eligibility equation and the private insurance equation.  For example, the demographic group 
with the lowest private insurance coverage for all the model specifications is children from 
families without any earners; the rate varies between 0.12 (from the SPM accounting for 
unobservables) and 0.16 (from the SPM with unobservables ignored). The highest variation in 
the estimated coverage rates among different models is for the children in families with two 
earners; it is 0.86 for the LPMI model and 0.61 for the SPM with unobservables accounted for.  
Column (4) reports actual private insurance coverage rates in the data and shows that the 
predicted rates from the SPM accounting for unobservables mirror the data remarkably well. 
 
demographic variables on the index functions for private insurance coverage is in the same direction 
when a child is eligible for Medicaid as when the child is not eligible.   
26 Again all columns in this Table are based on 1995 data. 
  33Estimated crowd-out rates among the eligible across demographic groups are reported in 
Table 6.  The crowd-out estimates for the LPMI in column (1) are small, and while only about 
half are statistically significant, the standard errors indicate that the crowd-out effects have 
narrow confidence intervals. The results for the SPM when we do not control for selection in 
column (2) are qualitatively similar to those from the LPMI, although they are smaller in most 
cases and have even narrower confidence intervals. When we account for selection in column 
(3), the confidence intervals widen, resulting in only one estimate that is statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  Nevertheless, the pattern of coefficients is quite similar to those in the 
other two columns.  Although there is some evidence that crowd-out rates are higher for groups 
that have higher levels of private insurance coverage (children in families where the highest 
earner has some college or is a high school graduate exhibit higher levels of crowding out and 
higher rates of private coverage than children in families where the highest earner does not have 
a high school degree, for example), this explanation is clearly not the only one, as crowd-out 
rates are generally highest (though still small) among groups with the largest take-up responses. 
5.4 Estimates of ATETs on Private Insurance Participation and Crowd-out for a Counterfactual 
Medicaid Eligibility Expansion 
In Table 7 we use our estimates to predict private insurance coverage rates among those made 
newly eligible by a 10% increase in the 1995 Medicaid income limits.
27  Again columns (1), (2), 
and (3) present the estimates based on the LPMI, the SPM without accounting for selection and 
the SPM accounting for selection, respectively. All of these coverage rates are precisely 
estimated, and as expected, are higher than the respective coverage rates for all eligible children 
in Table 6 (although similar qualitatively). Again the estimates based on the LPMI and SPM 
                                                 
27 The SPM estimates of the private insurance participation index functions for those who are and are not 
eligible for Medicaid are in columns (3) and (4) respectively of Table B2 in the Online Appendix. 
  34without allowing for selection are larger than those in column (3) for the SPM while allowing for 
selection. To consider one group, families without an earner, the private insurance coverage rate 
goes up to 0.24, 0.23 and 0.16 for the LPMI, the SPM not accounting for unobservables and the 
SPM while accounting for observables.   
We calculate crowd-out across different demographic groups for those made newly 
eligible by a 10% increase in the 1995 Medicaid income limits in Table 8. For the LPMI in 
column (1), the crowd-out rates are generally statistically insignificant and many of the point 
estimates are actually positive (indicating increases in private coverage with eligibility). 
However, the confidence intervals are quite large for these effects.  When we use the SPM but do 
not account for unobservables, all but two of the estimates indicate that Medicaid eligibility 
reduces private insurance coverage, as expected. However, the estimated magnitudes are quite 
small and despite quite narrow confidence intervals, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect on private coverage for most groups of newly eligible children. The exceptions are 
children in families where the highest earner is a high school graduate or has some college, 
children in families where the head is female, or children in families where there is just one 
earner.  Finally, when we use the SPM estimates and account for selection in Column (3), all of 
the point estimates indicate that Medicaid eligibility reduces private coverage, but the confidence 
intervals are so wide that we are unable to say anything definitive about the impact of the 
counterfactual expansion on private coverage crowd-out using this model.   
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we demonstrate how two approaches—a linear probability model with 
interactions (LPMI) and a switching probit model (SPM)—can be used to estimate a variety of 
marginal and non-marginal effects of Medicaid eligibility on Medicaid take-up, private insurance 
  35coverage, and crowd-out across different demographic groups.  These are the first such estimates 
available in the literature on the effects of Medicaid expansions. We first estimate LATEs for 
Medicaid eligibility, and find that the LATEs for take-up and crowd-out vary widely across 
demographic groups. Next, we predict take-up, private insurance coverage and crowd-out for 
those eligible under the current system. These estimates are precise and again vary substantially 
across the different demographic groups. We find that take-up is predicted to be highest among 
typically disadvantaged groups, but that crowd-out is predicted to be most substantial among 
slightly different groups, including children in families with earners that have somewhat more 
education.  Perhaps surprisingly, crowd-out does not appear to be higher among eligible children 
in groups with higher levels of private coverage originally.  The pattern of take-up and crowd-out 
effects suggests an important role for information provision and information flows in 
determining insurance coverage following an expansion.   
Finally, we use our approaches to estimate the effects of a counterfactual non-marginal 
expansion of eligibility.  All estimation methods produce sensible and relatively precise effects 
for Medicaid take-up and private insurance coverage among the newly eligible. We find 
Medicaid take-up rates following a counterfactual expansion are predicted to be substantially 
lower than take-up rates among the currently eligible, while private coverage rates are predicted 
to be substantially higher for the newly eligible. However, estimating crowd-out effects among 
the newly eligible is more challenging, and we find only the SPM when we do not allow for 
selection produces confidence intervals for crowd-out among the newly eligible which will be 
useful for policy makers. Overall, our results provide important information for policymakers 
about differences in response to eligibility across observable demographic groups, as well as 
information about how responses to eligibility differ between individuals who were previously 
  36eligible and those made newly eligible by a counterfactual Medicaid expansion.  In addition, the 
approaches we used here are useful not only in the context of the Medicaid program, but can also 
be used in evaluating the effects of many other social programs that rely on observable eligibility 
criteria, such as food and nutrition programs. 
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  42Table 1: Means of the Variables Used in Estimation 
 
SIPP Panel        1986       1987       1988        1990       1991        1992       1993 
 
Medicaid  0.12 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 
 
Private  Coverage  0.73 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.69 
 
Imputed  Eligibility  0.19 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.34 
 
Size  of  Health  Insurance  Unit  4.22 4.16 4.18 4.16 4.22 4.17 4.22 
 
White  0.83 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.81 
 
Male  0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 
 
Two  Parents  0.76 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.73 
 
Male  Head  Only  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03    0.03 0.03 0.02 
 
No  Earners  0.14 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 
 
One  Earner  0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 
 
Two  Earners  0.38 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 
 
Age  of  Highest  Earner  36.49 36.47 36.49 36.67 36.90 36.89 37.10 
      
Education  of  Highest  Earner  12.68 12.69 12.84 12.74 12.92 12.95 12.95 
 
FRACELIG  0.20 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 
 
    
Years  Covered  86-88 87-89 88-89 90-92 91-93 92-95 93-95 
 
Number  of  Observations  175709 182307 163165 397187 267589 433545 406833  
 
Notes: Shown are unweighted means from the respective SIPP panels noted above.  See the text for a 
description of the sample construction. 
  43Table 2: LATE Estimates for Medicaid Take-Up and Private Insurance Crowd-Out  
Among Different Demographic Groups 
 
                              Medicaid Take-Up           Private Insurance Crowd-out 
Group        (1)           (2)           
 
 
All Population  0.12***  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Race 
White 0.11***  0.01   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
Non-White 0.20*** -0.00   
 (0.01)  (0.02)   
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.24***  -0.03***   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
High School Graduate  0.13***  0.00   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
Some College  0.08***  0.02   
   (0.01)  (0.02)   
College Graduate   -0.02  0.06***   
  (0.02)  (0.02)  
 
Family Structure 
Female Head  0.30***  -0.06***   
 (0.01)  (0.02)   
Male Head  0.09***  -0.12**   
 (0.03)  (0.03)   
Two parents  0.06***  0.04***   
 (0.01)  (0.02)   
Number of Earners 
No earner  0.44***  -0.11***   
 (0.02)  (0.02)   
One earner  0.16*** -0.02***   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
Two earners  -0.04  0.11***   
 (0.02)  (0.02)   
More than two earners  -0.12  0.03   
 (0.03)  (0.05)   
 
Notes: All regressions/index functions include demographic main effects, year, age, state dummies, and a 
fourth month dummy. Standard errors have been corrected for repeated observations across the same 
children. *** significantly different from zero at the 1%   level; ** significantly different from zero at the 
5% level; * significantly different from zero at 10% level. 
  44Table 3: Estimated Medicaid Average Take-up Rates for All Eligible Children 
From the Linear Probability Model with Interactions and the Switching Probit Model 
 
                                              LPMI    SPM – Unobservables   SPM – Unobservables Actual                              
                                          .           Ignored               Accounted for  
Group       (1)          (2)                         (3)                 (4) 
 
All Population  0.47***  0.47***  0.51***  0.51 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Race 
White 0.41***  0.40***  0.44***  0.44 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Non-White 0.62***  0.64***  0.68***  0.67 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.61***  0.60***  0.62***  0.63 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
High School Graduate  0.44***  0.44***  0.48***  0.49 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)   
Some College  0.38***  0.40***  0.44***  0.44 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)   
College Graduate  0.19***  0.22***  0.27***  0.16 
  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Family Structure 
Female Head  0.68***  0.69***  0.72***  0.71 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Male Head  0.31***  0.28***  0.32***  0.30 
 (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Two parents  0.27***  0.26***  0.30***   0.31 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Number of Earners 
No earner  0.78***  0.77***  0.79***  0.78 
 (0.04)  (0.005)  (0.02) 
One earner  0.28***  0.28***  0.32***  0.33 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Two earners  0.09**  0.12***  0.18***  0.17 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
More than two earners  -0.03  0.08***  0.12***   0.14 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02)   
 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. All regressions/index functions include demographic main effects, year, age, 
state dummies, eligibility-year, eligibility-age and eligibility-state interactions and a fourth month 
dummy. Estimates are based on coefficients estimated using data from all SIPP panels and Medicaid 
eligible children in the 1995 data. 
 
  45Table 4: Counterfactual Policy Analysis: Estimated Medicaid Take-up Rates for the Newly 
Eligible after Raising the 1995 Income Limits by 10% 
 
 
                    LPMI       SPM – Unobservables   SPM- Unobservables 
         Ignored                 Accounted for  
Group          (1)       (2)             (3) 
 
All Newly Eligible Population 0.21***  0.21***    0.27*** 
   (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Race 
White 0.18***  0.18***  0.24*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Non-White 0.31***  0.32***  0.38*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.30***  0.28***  0.33*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
High School Graduate  0.21***  0.21***  0.26*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Some College  0.20***  0.21***  0.27*** 
   (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
College Graduate   0.07  0.11***  0.17*** 
  (0.06)  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Family Structure 
Female Head  0.38***  0.39***  0.46*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Male Head  0.15***  0.16***  0.21*** 
 (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Two parents  0.15***  0.15***   0.20*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Number of Earners 
No earner  0.63***  0.63***  0.66*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
One earner  0.23*** 0.22***  0.28*** 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Two earners  0.09  0.11***  0.17*** 
 (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
More than two earners  -0.07  0.06***  0.11*** 
 (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Estimates are based on coefficients estimated using data from all SIPP panels 
and children in the 1995 data made newly eligible by the increase in the Medicaid income limits.  
 
 
  46Table 5: Estimated Average Private Insurance Coverage Rates for All Eligible Children 
From the Linear Probability Model with Interactions and the Switching Probit Model 
         
             LPMI     SPM – Unobservables  SPM – Unobservables  Actual  
                                                                            Ignored           Accounted for                   
Group                     (1)             (2)           (3)                      (4)   
 
All Population  0.44***  0.44***  0.34***  0.34 
             (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Race 
White 0.50***  0.50***  0.39***  0.38 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Non-White 0.31***  0.30**  0.23***  0.22   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.25 ***  0.26***  0.19***   0.18 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
High School Graduate  0.49***  0.49***  0.37***  0.36 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Some College  0.58***  0.57***  0.44***  0.46 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
College Graduate  0.81***  0.79***  0.64***  0.69 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Family Structure 
Female Head  0.27***  0.27***  0.21***  0.21 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) 
Male Head  0.42***  0.49***  0.36***  0.37 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Two parents  0.62***  0.61***  0.47***  0.46   
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Number of Earners 
No earner  0.14***  0.16 ***  0.12***  0.13 
 (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
One earner  0.62***  0.62***  0.47***  0.46 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Two earners  0.86***  0.81***  0.61***  0.61 
  
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
More than two earners  0.88***  0.85***  0.69***  0.63 
 (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.05)   
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 are private insurance participation rates when a Medicaid 
eligible child stays eligible, ignoring unobservables. Column 3 presents private insurance participation 
rates when a Medicaid eligible child stays eligible, including the effect of unobservables. Estimates in 
columns (2) and (3) are based on maximizing (11).   
  47Table 6: Estimated Crowd-out Rates for All Eligible Children 
    
                    LPMI             SPM - Unobservables     SPM - Unobservables 
                                                 Ignored                       Accounted for 
Group         (1)               (2)                   (3) 
 
All Population  -0.05**  -0.02*  -0.05   
             (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Race 
White -0.05**  -0.01  -0.05 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Non-White -0.06*  -0.02*  -0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  -0.08**  -0.005  -0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
High School Graduate  -0.05**  -0.03***  -0.06 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Some  College -0.03 -0.04*** -0.07 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
College Graduate  0.03  -0.02  -0.06 
 (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
 
Family Structure       
Female Head  -0.10**  -0.04***  -0.05** 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Male Head  -0.16**  -0.03  -0.06 
 (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
Two parents  -0.005  -0.004  -0.04  
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Number of Earners       
No earner  -0.11**  -0.03*  -0.03 
 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
One earner  -0.03**  -0.03*   -0.06 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
Two earners  0.08**  0.002  -0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
More than two earners  0.10   0.03   0.01  
 (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Estimates are based on coefficients estimated using data from all SIPP panels 
and Medicaid eligible children in the 1995 data. Recall that the SPM estimates separate private insurance 
participation equations when eligible for Medicaid and when ineligible. Thus, estimates in Columns (2) 
and (3) are calculated using coefficients from Columns (3) and (4) of Table B2 in the Online Appendix, 
respectively.  
  48Table 7: Counterfactual Policy Analysis: Estimated Private Insurance Coverage Rates for 
the Newly Eligible after Raising the Income Limits by 10% 
 
                                                      LPMI               SPM – Unobservables   SPM – Unobservables  
                                                                                         Ignored                Accounted For 
 Group                          (1)                       (2)               (3)     
All Newly Eligible Population  0.74*** 0.71*** 0.49***     
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05)     
Race 
White  0.76*** 0.73*** 0.52*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
Non-White  0.65*** 0.62*** 0.39*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.57***  0.55***  0.33*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
High School Graduate  0.74***  0.72***  0.51*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
Some  College  0.78*** 0.76*** 0.54*** 
    (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
College  Graduate  0.99*** 0.90*** 0.70*** 
  (0.04)  (0.01) (0.05) 
Family Structure 
Female  Head  0.59*** 0.58*** 0.37*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
Male  Head  0.62*** 0.67*** 0.42*** 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Two  parents  0.80*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
Number of Earners 
No  earner  0.24*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
One  earner  0.71*** 0.69*** 0.47*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
Two earners  0 90***  0.84***  0.60*** 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) 
More than two earners  0.99***  0.93***  0.72*** 
            (0.01)         (0.02)    (0.06) 
 Notes: See notes to Table 3. Estimates are based on parameter estimates for the entire sample and the 
characteristics of the children in the 1995 SIPP data made newly eligible for Medicaid under our 




  49Table 8: Counterfactual Policy Analysis: Crowd-out Rates for the Newly Eligible 
Population after Raising Medicaid Income Limits by 10% 
 
                             LPMI                     SPM - Unobservables    SPM – Unobservables 
                                                       Ignored                 Accounted for 
Group         (1)                    (2)                    (3) 
 
All  Population  -0.03 -0.02 -0.07   
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
Race 
White  0.03 -0.02 -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
Non-White 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
Education of Highest Earner 
High School Drop-out  0.02  0.02  -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
High School Graduate  0.02  -0.03*  -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
Some College  0.03  -0.03**  -0.09 
    (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
College  Graduate  0.10 -0.02 -0.09 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
 
Family Structure 
Female Head  -0.01  -0.03*  -0.09 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Male  Head -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 
  (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) 
Two parents  0.06   -0.01  -0.06 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
Number of Earners 
No  earner  -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) 
One earner  0.01  -0.03*  -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) 
Two  earners  0.09 -0.01 -0.06 
  (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
More than two earners  0.13   0.01  -0.03 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) 
 Notes: See notes to Table 3. Estimates are based on coefficients estimated using data from all SIPP 
panels and children in the 1995 data made newly eligible by the increase in the Medicaid income limits. 
Estimates in Columns (2) and (3) are calculated using coefficients from Columns (3) and (4) of Table B2 
in the Online Appendix, respectively.  
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